An analysis on the interrelations between conceptions and quasi-myths about corruption

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22481/ccsa.v20i36.11662

Keywords:

Corruption, Culture, Economics, Politics, Quasi-myths

Abstract

Abstract:This article centers its analysis on a three-dimensional understanding of the causes and impacts
of corruption. The objective was to elucidate the intersection between the phenomenon of corruption and
the economic, political and cultural contexts of a nation, in order to promote a better understanding of the
complexity that surrounds the subject. In order to achieve this goal, concepts and data collected from the
specialized scientific literature and technical materials published by scholars in the area were examined, a
process that had as its starting point the investigations carried out by Professor Matthew Stephenson.
Throughout the study, it was demonstrated that, despite the harmful effects they cause to society, corrupt
practices persist and can be stimulated by distorted views about the economic, political and cultural
conceptions that qualify the concept of corruption. Some of these narratives (quasi-myths), analyzed by
Stephenson, are widespread and capable of inhibiting attempts to fight corruption effectively. In
conclusion, one can observe a movement that is characterized by an active role, by influencing and
shaping the functioning of the economy, politics and culture of a country, as well as by a passive role,
which stems and develops from these contexts.

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Author Biography

Saada Luedy Matos Soares Oliveira, State University of Santa Cruz

Pós-Graduada em Direito Penal, Anticorrupção e Compliance. Advogada. Graduada em Direito pela Universidade Estadual de Santa Cruz (UESC).

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Published

2023-12-21

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