Intencionalidade racionalizada: como fatos simples se tornam uma fonte de perplexidade (Rationalized intentionality: How simple facts become a source of perplexity)

Joana Franco

doi:10.22481/el.v22.12699

Autores/as

Joana Franco Universidade de São Paulo (USP/ Brasil) https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3130-2960

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22481/el.v22.12699

Palabras clave:

intencionalidad; adquisición de lenguaje; teoría gestual; teoría cooperativa; Tomasello.

Resumen

La teoría de Michael Tomasello es una de las más celebradas en los estudios lingüísticos centrados en el uso y la interacción. En este artículo pretendo mostrar que se basa en supuestos contradictorios, que comprometen los preceptos gradualistas de una visión emergentista de la cognición. Los conceptos de acción y comprensión intencionales (≈ intencionalidad) que subyacen en la teoría gestual se basan en modelos cognitivos que asumen la posesión de contenido proposicional y habilidades de razonamiento lógico. Los gestos deícticos y los motivos cooperativos, que centralizan los argumentos a favor del primitivismo de la intencionalidad conjunta/compartida, funcionan como dispositivos teóricos que racionalizan la comunicación de los niños prelingüísticos, con el objetivo de preservar la singularidad humana frente a otros primates. La racionalización del concepto de intencionalidad, que se puede mapear a lo largo de una secuencia de publicaciones, demuestra que el problema abordado tiene más que ver con una concepción idealizada de la intencionalidad que con hechos empíricos.

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Biografía del autor/a

Joana Franco, Universidade de São Paulo (USP/ Brasil)

Joana Bortolini Franco é doutora em Linguística e Semiótica pelo Departamento de Linguística da Universidade de São Paulo, bacharel em Linguística/Português e mestra em Linguística pelo mesmo departamento. Há mais de dez anos investiga as potencialidades de diálogo entre a filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein e as teorias linguísticas cognitivas, com interesse nas discussões de caráter epistêmico-metodológico a respeito das bases naturalistas das ciências da linguagem.

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