L'expérience de l'unité de la conscience dans l'acte de la volonté: pour la réalité de l'objet de l'intentionalité

Abstract

The aim of this article is the qualitative assessment of change in a time interval. Time, as a key concept at the confluence of which the observations on movement began, has been problematized according to the theory of intentionality of the mind together with the theory of internal perception (Brentano, 1874). As far as possible and for objective observation, the method has framed the movement of time in the additive model of arithmetic schemata. When the contact of the contraction forces manifests a change, it is always the normality of consciousness that is considered in relation to the change. From the activity of consciousness thus heterogeneous, and in the direction of the contents of experience, a problem emerges for analysis, namely: the retention of memory from its quantitative point of view. So with this retention considered as a faculty of human intelligence, some contributions are proposed here in the face of a theory of recognition already well developed by Bergson (1889; 1939).